ManiGen: A Manifold Aided Black-box Generator of Adversarial Examples by Liu, Guanxiong et al.
1ManiGen: A Manifold Aided Black-box Generator
of Adversarial Examples
Guanxiong Liu, Issa Khalil, Abdallah Khreishah, Abdulelah Algosaibi, Adel Aldalbahi, Mohammed Alaneem,
Abdulaziz Alhumam, and Mohammed Anan
Abstract—Machine learning models, especially neural network
(NN) classifiers, have acceptable performance and accuracy that
leads to their wide adoption in different aspects of our daily lives.
The underlying assumption is that these models are generated
and used in attack free scenarios. However, it has been shown
that neural network based classifiers are vulnerable to adver-
sarial examples. Adversarial examples are inputs with special
perturbations that are ignored by human eyes while can mislead
NN classifiers. Most of the existing methods for generating
such perturbations require a certain level of knowledge about
the target classifier, which makes them not very practical. For
example, some generators require knowledge of pre-softmax
logits while others utilize prediction scores.
In this paper, we design a practical black-box adversarial
example generator, dubbed ManiGen. ManiGen does not require
any knowledge of the inner state of the target classifier. It
generates adversarial examples by searching along the manifold,
which is a concise representation of input data. Through extensive
set of experiments on different datasets, we show that (1) adver-
sarial examples generated by ManiGen can mislead standalone
classifiers by being as successful as the state-of-the-art white-
box generator, Carlini, and (2) adversarial examples generated
by ManiGen can more effectively attack classifiers with state-of-
the-art defenses.
Index Terms—Adversarial Examples, Machine Learning, Neu-
ral Network, Manifold
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the surprisingly good representation power of com-
plex distributions, neural network models are widely used
in many applications including natural language processing,
computer vision and cyber security. For example, in cyber
security, neural network (NN) classifiers are used for spam
filtering, phishing detection as well as face recognition [1]
[2]. However, the training and usage of NN classifiers are
based on an underlying assumption that the environment is
attack free. Therefore, such classifiers fail when adversarial
examples are presented to them. Adversarial examples were
first introduced in 2013 by Szegedy et. al [3] in the context
of image classification. They show that adversarial examples
can be generated by adding specially designed perturbations
to original images. As shown in Figure 1, such perturbations
are visually insignificant to human eyes, but strong enough to
mislead the classifier to output an incorrect result. Yet, more
scary, the results show that the success rate of such attack
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Fig. 1: Fast Gradient Sign Example [4]
against standalone classifiers can reach 100%. That is, all the
generated adversarial examples are missclassified.
The introduction of adversarial examples presents a serious
threat to the applicability and adoption of neural network
models, especially in critical and sensitive applications such as
banking and security [5]. For example, adversarial examples
can mislead a neural network model that identifies digits writ-
ten on a check, which may result in incorrect cashed amounts.
On another example, a specially designed image may be used
to bypass a security check that utilizes neural networks. This
serious threat inspires a new line of research to understand
the mechanisms exploited to generate adversarial examples,
in order to develop appropriate defensive mechanisms.
One of the early attempts to understand adversarial ex-
amples was performed by Szegedy et al. [3], in which they
estimated that the root cause behind the successful generation
of adversarial examples against NN classifiers is the highly
non-linear property of neural networks. However, a follow
on work by Goodfellow et. al [4] shows that adversarial
examples can be generated by the fast gradient sign method.
This simply means that even very linear neural network
models are also vulnerable to adversarial examples. Therefore,
more researchers believe that adversarial examples against NN
classifiers are possible due to the linearity of the models,
not its non-linearity, and due to its inability to handle high
dimensional data.
Current generators of adversarial examples can be cate-
gorized into white-box and black-box versions. The white-
box generators usually formulate an optimization problem
which utilizes information from target classifier’s prediction
or inner states. By solving the optimization problem, the
adversarial examples are generated [4], [6]. In contrast to
white-box generators, black-box generators assume the target
classifier is intransparent. Therefore, black-box generators al-
ways try to utilize indirect information to generate adversarial
examples [7], [8]. From the practical perspective, the black-



















2However, the current black-box generators are far from perfect.
The trasferability-based black-box generator [7] has lower
success rate due to the difference between target and substitute
classifiers. And, the zeroth order black-box generator [8]
requires the prediction confidence on all classes from the target
classifier.
In this paper, we first propose a practical way to generate
adversarial examples by searching along the manifold of the
training data. The manifold is a hyperplane formed by low
dimensional data points from the original high dimensional
space. To search for adversarial examples, our approach,
dubbed ManiGen, solves an optimization problem which
can search along the manifold using the Gradient Descent
Algorithm [9] [10]. To the best of our knowledge, ManiGen
is the first black-box approach that utilizes the manifold
of the training data to generate adversarial examples. That
is, ManiGen can generate adversarial examples with zero
knowledge of the structure and inner state from the target
classifier.
Compared with the existing black-box generators, our pro-
posed ManiGen has the following advantages. Firstly, it does
not rely on the transferability of adversarial examples between
target and substitute classifiers [7]. Secondly, it does not
requires extra information other than prediction results from
the target classifier [8].
We conduct experiments to compare the adversarial exam-
ples generated by ManiGen and those generated by Carlini,
which is a state-of-the-art white-box generator. The results
show that ManiGen adversarial examples can mislead stan-
dalone classifiers with 100% success rate which is at the
same level as Carlini. More importantly, the results also show
that the adversarial examples generated by ManiGen are more
threatening to classifiers with defenses.
Our contributions in this paper can be summarized as
follows:
• We design a black-box approach for generating adversarial
examples against NN classifier. More specifically, our ap-
proach, dubbed ManiGen, is distinguished by being model
agnostic, that is, it generates adversarial examples without
demanding any information about the inner states of the
target classifier. Instead, ManiGen utilizes the autoencoder
based approach to search adversarial examples along the
manifold of the training data.
• Compared with the existing black-box generators [7], [8],
ManiGen outperforms them in two aspects. (1) It does
not depend on the transferability of adversarial examples
between target and substitute classifiers. (2) It does not
require information other than prediction results from target
classifier.
• We show through extensive set of experiments that ManiGen
adversarial examples have 100% success rate in misleading
standalone NN classifiers. More importantly, adversarial
examples generated from ManiGen are more threatening to
classifiers with defenses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents background and related work. The designs of
ManiGen are presented in Sections III. Section IV, presents the
test-bed design and the experimental settings. The evaluation
results are presented in Section V and Section VI concludes
the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we introduce high level background knowl-
edge about NN classifiers, autoencoder and manifolds for
better understanding of the concepts presented in this work.
We also, provide relevant references for further information
about each topic.
A. Neural Network Classifier
Neural network (NN) were introduced by several biological
and computer science researchers in early 1900s but did not
have the due attention because of its high computation cost.
However, it lately gain more traction due to the considerable
increase in computing power, which makes them practical in
many machine learning applications including computer vi-
sion, pattern recognition, cyber security, and natural language
processing [11]. In this paper, we consider the popular use
case of NN in classification applications. After being trained
with labeled set of data, a NN classifier can learn to classify
new input instances into one of a number of predefined set of
classes.
The general structure of a NN is shown in Figure 2. It could
be seen as a collection of layers and each layer contains a
certain number of neurons. The connections between neurons
have different weights, ω, and the value of a neuron is a non-
linear transformation of the weighted sum of neurons con-
nected to it. This non-linear transformation is called activation
function and defined by user. In NN classifier, the weighted
sum value in the final layer neurons are also called pre-softmax
logits, Z, since the activation function of final layer is usually
softmax function which is defined as f(xi) = e
xi∑
exi .
From the system level point of view, a NN classifier is
equivalent to a highly non-linear function which maps input
data to a prediction. Based on the difference between the
predictions and the corresponding ground truth, a loss function
is formulated as a function of Θ, which is denoted as lossΘ.
During the training process, the gradient decent algorithm
[9] [10] is used to iteratively minimize the value of the loss
function. Finally, the famous backward propagation algorithm
is used [12] to update the gradients throughout the whole NN.
B. Autoencoder and Manifold
Autoencoder is an unsupervised NN model. It is designed
to learn a representation, which is called code, of a set of data
through unsupervised learning. Typically, the autoencoder is
used to learn a low dimensional encoding of a high dimen-
sional data. For example, a normal 32×32 RGB image can be
represented as a 3D matrix of 32×32×3 = 3072 dimensional
data. The autoencoder takes the 3D matrix representation of
the image as input and generates a 128 dimensional vector
representation of the image.
The general structure of the autoencoder is composed of an
encoder and a decoder as depicted in Figure 3. Through the
connected layers inside the encoder, input data is squeezed
3and mapped to a code, which is usually a lower dimensional
data. Then, the decoder takes the code and expands it back to
the original size. During the training, the difference between
input data and the output from the decoder is calculated and
used as a loss function value. By compressing and extracting
input data with a lower loss function value, the autoencoder
learns how to efficiently map high dimensional input data to
a lower dimensional code.
In machine learning community, researchers believe that
the relevant data for a certain task lies on a hyperplane,
called Manifold, in the original high dimensional space [14].
By flattening the manifold, we can get a lower dimensional
representation of the original data points. The autoencoder is
one of the most popular tools to learn the manifold and gen-
erate lower dimensional codes from input data. The distance
between any two codes can be used to reflect the similarity of
their corresponding data points. Since the code is in a much
lower dimensional space, this distance is more representative
and more reliable than the distance calculated from the original
high dimensional space. Based on the property of autoencoder,
it is widely used in computer vision and natural language
processing for semantic analysis [15].
C. Generators of Adversarial Examples
The generators of adversarial examples against NN clas-
sifiers are generally categorized into white-box and black-
box based approaches. White-box based generators are usually
easier to build, but not very practical as they require access
to the target NN classifier [6] [16]. On the other hand, black-
box based generators are model agnostic as they can operate
without any knowledge of the inner working of the target NN
classifier [17]. Black-box based generators are more practical,
however, they are much harder to design and implement.
Therefore, the majority of existing adversarial example gener-
ators are white-box based ones. In the following, we highlight
the design approach of the state-of-the-art adversarial example
generators.
In the general format, the adversarial example genera-
tor could be formulated as an optimization problem which
searches a small neighbor area of the original image for the
existence of adversarial examples. Assume an original image
could be denoted as x and the perturbation we made to it could
be represented by δ, the process of searching for adversarial




subject to C(x, δ) 6= t
F(x+ δ) ∈ [0, 1]m
By solving this optimization problem, a special perturbation
δ, which could minimize the visual difference from original
image that is denoted as D, will be found. There are several
different choices for the D function which include L2, L0 and
L∞. In this paper, to make the D function fully differentiable,
ManiGen choose L2 distance which is a normal choice in
many other works.
In the optimization formulation, we called the first constraint
as “effective constraint” while the second constraint as
“validation constraint”. The current perturbation is strong
enough to fool the classifier C if and only if C(x + δ) 6= t
where t is the true label of original image. The F function
ensures that the generated adversarial example is still a valid
image.
From the original formulation of this optimization problem,
the ”effective constraint” C could be naturally explained as
the classification function. However, due to the truth that
modern classifier is highly non-linear, it is hard to directly
solve the optimization problem in the original format and dif-
ferent methods have different approximation of this ”effective
constraint”. For white-box attack, the softmax result or the
loss function based on it are usually used since these attack
could get access to inner information from target classifier as
Figure 5.
Gradient Sign Method is introduced by Goodfellow et.
al in [4] as a white-box adversarial example image generator
against NN image classifiers. It simply generates adversarial
examples from original images by adding a small value ()
from each pixel in the same direction of the gradients of
the loss function. From the previous formulation, this method
utilizes  as step size to make sure the adversarial examples are
visually similar. At the same time, it tries to maximize the loss
function, which represents the similarity between prediction
and ground truth, in order to fool the classifier. Therefore, it
tries to solve the following optimization problem.
maximize
δ
lossf (x, δ, t)
subject to F(x+ δ) ∈ [0, 1]m
The early implementation of this formulation is the Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [4] which only applies gradi-
ents once. A more recent work in [6] introduces the Basic Iter-
ative Method (BIM) which repeats the gradient sign method in
multiple smaller steps to generate more threatening adversarial
examples.
Carlini Attack Generator is a set of white-box attacks
designed by Nicholas Carlini [16]. The generators are carefully
designed to utilize pre-softmax logits to calculate gradients.
This makes it effective in misleading classifiers which try
to hide their final prediction scores from adversaries. The
approach in this work could be formulated as follows with
e = max
i6=t




D(x, δ) + c×max(0, e)
subject to F(x+ δ) ∈ [0, 1]m
This method is recognized as a standard for white-box
generators since it can efficiently utilize pre-softmax results
from target classifiers to generate adversarial examples, which
are shown to defeat many of the state-of-the-art defensive
methods. However, similar to the previous method, it is not
very practical due to the required access to the pre-sofmax
results.
Black-box Generators are more practical than the white-
box generators. Existing works show two ways of generating
black-box adversarial examples. As shown in Figure 6, one
way of doing so is to train a substitute which approximates
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Fig. 6: Black-box Approximation Fig. 7: ManiGen Approximation
the decision boundary of the target classifier [7]. Once the
substitute is ready, any white-box attack method could be
used to generate adversarial examples. However, the difference
between substitute and target classifiers degenerates the suc-
cess rate of generating adversarial examples. Beside this, other
researchers propose a zeroth order method which empirically
approximates the gradients [8]. It changes the value of each
pixel in a small range and measures the corresponding changes
in prediction confidence. The problem is that this approach
cannot be applied when only prediction results are provided.
D. Adversarial Example Defensive Methods
Based on literature review, we select two different rep-
resentative defense methods of adversarial examples. The
first approach aims at performing dimensional reduction and
transformation of input data, while the other approach focuses
on utilizing some adversarial examples to retrain the target
classifiers. In the following, We introduce one representative
example from each of the these approaches:
Dimensional Reduction and Transformation is introduced
by Meng et. al [17]. In this work, the authors design two
types of functional components which are called detector
and reformer. Adversarial examples are either rejected by the
detector or reformed to clean up the adversarial perturba-
tions. The detector can be designed based on an autoencoder
structure or based on the probability divergence concept [17].
On the other hand, the reformer is simply an autoencoder
based detector. The reformer is designed to recognize and
remove small adversarial perturbation in input samples. On the
other hand, the detector is designed to recognize adversarial
examples with strong perturbations that bypass the reformer.
The main drawback of this method is that the reformer can
only work efficiently with simple images and fails to efficiently
handle perturbations in complex images.
Adversarial Training is based on a simple idea that treats
adversarial examples as blind spots of the original training data
[18]. Through retaining by samples of adversarial examples,
the classifier learns new features from adversarial examples
and generalizes its prediction to account for such perturbations.
By far, adversarial training is one of the most efficient ways to
mitigate adversarial examples. However, adversarial training
based defenses [4], [19]–[22] require access to adversarial
examples during the training process, which makes it effective
only against known adversarial examples and may fail with
new ones.
III. MANIFOLD BASED ATTACK MODEL
In this section, we introduce our approach for generating
adversarial examples. Based on the general format introduced
in Section II, we show our approximation of the optimiza-
tion problem. After that, we introduce the constraints of the
optimization problem.
A. Objective Function
Compared with methods introduced previously, our ap-
proach aims at generating black-box adversarial examples.
Therefore, our method has no access to the inner information
from target classifier. Therefore, the searching processing in
black-box fashion is non-trivial since we can not change the
searching direction based on reaction of the classifier through
gradient decent method.
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manifold learning from unsupervised learning area into our
approach. From many existing works in the manifold learning
area [14] [23], people noticed that the relevant data of an AI
task are always near or on a manifold which has a much lower
dimension than the full sample space and Figure 4 could be
seen as an example. Moreover, by projecting data samples onto
this manifold, we are trying to keep both linear and non-linear
data structure information.
Intuitively speaking, in the image classification application,
the original image space could be seen as ”visual space” while
its projection space on the manifold could be seen as ”semantic
space”. To combine the manifold learning and let it guide
the searching of adversarial example, we made the following
assumption:
Assumption : We assume that there exists a set of
examples which are close to the original sample in the
“visual space” but relatively far away from it in the
“semantic space”. When the distance is close enough in
“visual space” and far enough in ”semantic space”, these
examples are the adversarial examples to the original
sample.
Based on our previous assumption, we have two methods
to approach the ”effective constraint” C as:
C 6= t→ ||AE(x, δ)−AE(x)||2 ≥ dvisual
OR
C 6= t→ ||E(x, δ)− E(x)||2 ≥ dsemantic
where AE represents the autoencoder’s non-linear transforma-
tion and E represents the encoder’s non-linear transformation.
In this paper, all of our adversarial examples are generated by
utilizing the first implementation since the generated images
are more similar to original sample. The possible reason could
be related to that L2 distance metric in “visual space” and
“semantic space” are not suitable to be added together directly.
However, we get this understanding from experiments directly
and a detailed study of these two implementations could be in
future works.
Now, our autoencoder based approximation of the opti-
mization problem without constraint could be summarized as
follows and Figure 7 gives an intuitive visualization of utilizing
autoencoder for our approximation.
minimize
δ
D(x, δ)− c× ||AE(x, δ)−AE(x)||2
subject to F(x+ δ) ∈ [0, 1]m
B. Constraint
After the transformation of “effective constraint”, the only
constraint left in the original optimization problem is the
“validation constraint”. By applying this constraint, we want
to make sure the generated adversarial example is a valid
image. However, in order to make the searching more efficient,
we want to find a proper way to handle this problem. To
achieve this goal, we first denote that δ ∈ Rm. Then, we
could naturally define the transform function as:




)) + δ) +
1
2
In our implementation, we use arctan(2×(x− 12 )×0.99999)
instead to avoid the situation of calculating arctan(1) or
arctan(−1). With the help of this transformation, we could get
rid of directly checking the “validation constraint” which may
decrease the searching efficiency. Moreover, with this trans-
formation, generating adversarial examples could be achieved
by solving an unconstrained optimization problem with no
limitation on the algorithm.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
This section presents the experimental ecosystem we use
to evaluate the confusion capabilities of adversarial examples
generated by our proposed ManiGen. The main components
of our test-bed include: (1) Pre-processing module, (2) Attack
module, (3) Classification module, and (4) Defense module.
The attack and defense modules serve as containers in which
different attack and defense models are plugged and unplugged
based on specific experimental settings. The input data used
by the test-bed is scaled and then separated into training and
testing sets. The pre-processed data and, in some cases, the
original data flow into the attack module, which generates
adversarial examples and interacts with the classification mod-
ule to refine them. The refined adversarial examples are then
passed to the defensive module to evaluate its effectiveness in
correctly classifying the examples.
We explain different attack models in earlier sections and
in the following sections, we elaborate on the remaining com-
ponents of the test-bed, after presenting the datasets utilized.
A. Datasets
We use the following datasets to conduct our experiments:
• MNIST: Contains a total of 70K, 28 × 28, gray scale
labeled images of handwritten digits.
• CIFAR10: Contains a total of 60K, 32×32, RGB labeled
images of animals and vehicles.
• STL10: Contains a total of 6K, 96 × 96, RGB labeled
images of animals and vehicles.
The images in each dataset are evenly labeled into 10 different
classes.
B. Pre-processing
Pre-processing involves the following operations:
• Scaling: Gray scale images use one integer to represent each
of its pixels, while RGB images use three different integers
(each between 0 and 255) to represent each of its pixels.
To simplify the process of finding adversarial examples and
to be consistent with the related work, scaling is used to
map pixel representations from discrete integers in the range
Z[0,255] into real numbers in the range R[0,1].
• Separation: This operation is used to split each input dataset
into two groups: training-dataset and testing-dataset. The
training dataset is used to train the supervised machine
learning modules including, autoencoders, classifiers, and
defensive modules, while the testing dataset is used by
the attack modules to guide the generation of adversarial
examples, as well as for evaluating the defensive modules.
6The 70K MNIST images are randomly separated into 60K
training and 10K testing images, the 60K CIFAR10 images
are randomly separated into 50K training and 10K testing
images, and the 6K STL10 images are randomly separated
into 5K training and 1K testing images.
• Autoencoder: As mentioned earlier, the autoencoder is uti-
lized in our black-box based adversarial example genera-
tor. It is trained with training datasets and used to guide
the search along the manifold to generate our adversar-
ial examples. We utilize two different deep convolutional
autoencoder structures, which are shown in Table I. For
MNIST, we encode each original image from 784 (28×28)
dimension into 128 (4×4×8) dimension in semantic space,
while in CIFAR10 and STL10, we encode each image from
3072 (32 × 32 × 3) and 27648 (96 × 96 × 3) dimensions
into 256 (4 × 4 × 16) dimension. The training settings of
these autoencoders are presented in Table II.
Autoencoder
Layer Parameter Padding Activation
Encoder
Convolution 3× 3×X1 Same ReLU
Pooling 2× 2 Same -
Convolution 3× 3×X2 Same ReLU
Pooling 2× 2 Same -
Convolution 3× 3×X2 Same ReLU
Pooling 2× 2 Same -
Decoder
Convolution 3× 3×X2 Same ReLU
Up Sampling 2× 2 - -
Convolution 3× 3×X2 Same ReLU
Up Sampling 2× 2 - -
Convolution 3× 3×X1 Same ReLU
Up Sampling 2× 2 - -
Convolution 3× 3×X3 Same Sigmoid
TABLE I: Autoencoder Structure (For MNIST, X1 = 16,
X2 = 8, X3 = 1 and using Max Pooling. For CIFAR10 and
STL10, X1 = 32, X2 = 16, X3 = 3 and using Average
Pooling.)
Autoencoder Training
Setting MNIST CIFAR10 & STL10
Optimizer Adam Adam
Learning Rate 0.01 0.01
Loss Function Binary Cross-Entropy Mean Square Error
Batch Size 128 256
Shuffle Yes Yes
Epoch 50 100
TABLE II: Autoencoder Training Setting
C. Classification Module
This module implements standalone classifier and is mainly
used by the attack component of the test-bed to guide the
process of adversarial example generation. After an adversarial
example is generated, the attack generator forwards it to the
target classifier to check if it succeeds in misleading that
classifier. The result of the test is fed back to the adversarial
example generator, which uses it to refine the next adversarial
examples. We note that the output of the target classifier is
customized based on the specific adversarial example genera-
tor. For example, ManiGen example generator expects a binary
output that indicates whether the prediction is right or wrong.
On the other hand, the Carlini generator expects the output
to include the final logits Z from the classifier, which contain
the inner information from the last NN layer.
In our test-bed evaluation, we select a different classifier
for each dataset with performance that matches the relevant
benchmarks [24]. The structure for the classifier used with
the MNIST dataset is shown in Tabel III, while the structure
for the allCNN classifier [25] used with the CIFAR10 dataset
is shown in Table IV. For the STL10 dataset classifier, we
apply transfer learning based on VGG16 model [26] trained
on ImageNet dataset [27]. The training settings of each of the
three classifiers are shown in Table V. It is worth to note that
softmax logits (or pre-softmax logits Z) is required by existing
white-box and black-box adversarial example generators. As
a more practical black-box generator, our ManiGen does not
require this information.
MNIST - Classifier
Layer Parameter Padding Activation
Convolution 3× 3× 16 Same ReLU
Max. Pooling 2× 2 Same -
Convolution 3× 3× 8 Same ReLU
Max. Pooling 2× 2 Same -
Convolution 3× 3× 8 Same ReLU
Max. Pooling 2× 2 Same -
Dense 128 - ReLU
Dense 10 - Softmax
TABLE III: MNIST Classifier Structure
CIFAR10 - Classifier
Layer Parameter Padding Activation
Convolution 3× 3× 96 Same ReLU
Convolution 3× 3× 96 Same ReLU
Convolution 3× 3× 96 Same ReLU
Max Pooling 2× 2 Same -
Dropout 0.5 - -
Convolution 3× 3× 192 Same ReLU
Convolution 3× 3× 192 Same ReLU
Convolution 3× 3× 192 Same ReLU
Max Pooling 2× 2 Same -
Dropout 0.5 - -
Convolution 3× 3× 192 Same ReLU
Convolution 1× 1× 192 Same ReLU
Convolution 1× 1× 10 Same ReLU
Global Avg. Pooling - - -
Dense 10 - Softmax
TABLE IV: CIFAR10 allCNN Classifier Structure
Classifier - Training
Setting MNIST CIFAR10 STL10
Optimizer Adam SGD Adadelta
Learning Rate 0.01 0.01 1.0
Loss Function Cross Entropy Cross Entropy Cross Entropy
Batch Size 128 32 32
Shuffle Yes Yes Yes
Width Shift - 0.2 -
Height Shift - 0.2 -
Horizontal Flip - True -
Epoch 100 350 50
TABLE V: Classifier Training Setting
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The attack module implements two adversarial example
generators, the Carlini and the ManiGen. Each of the gen-
erators interacts with the appropriate standalone classifier,
according to the dataset under consideration, to refine its
generated adversarial examples. The pre-processed data and,
in some cases, the original data flow into the attack module,
which iteratively solves an optimization problem to generate
adversarial examples. Recall that the Carlini method is a
white-box generator which requires the pre-softmax logits
that contains the inner information of the target classifier.
While, for the black-box ManiGen, it only need to know
that the classifier is making right or wrong prediction. For
both adversarial example generators (Carlini and ManiGen),
we only run the algorithm for the same predefined number of
iterations. The final generated examples are used as adversarial
examples for evaluation.
E. Defensive Module
In the defensive module, we implement two approaches: (i)
MagNet [17], and (ii) traditional adversarial training method,
which we call AdvDef [6]. In the implemntaion of MagNet, we
follow its original designe as presented in [17]. For AdvDef,
we utilize the same structures as those of the standalone
classifiers mentioned earlier.
Adversarial examples generated by the attack module are
passed to the defensive module to evaluate its capability to
mislead the classifier with defense. During the evaluation, the
only measurement considered in this work is the test accuracy.
However, for different kinds of input examples, our definition
of test accuracy is different. If the input examples are original
examples, the test accuracy follows its traditional definition
which can be formulated as:
Test Accuracy ≡ # of correctly classified input examples
total # of input examples
(1)
When the input examples are adversarial examples, both mak-
ing correct prediction and rejecting the input are considered as
a success from the defender’s perspective. Now, the definition
of test accuracy is as follows:
Test Accuracy ≡
# of correctly classified and rejected input examples
total # of input examples
(2)
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present comparative evaluation results
of our adversarial example generators, ManiGen. We first
visualize and compare adversarial examples generated by
ManiGen from MNIST, CIFAR10, and STL10 datasets, with
those generated by Carlini and the corresponding original im-
ages. Then, we evaluate the capability of ManiGen adversarial
examples in misleading classifiers with or without defense.
During the evaluation, we select the Carlini generator as
the reference. It is worth to notice that the Carlini method is
a white-box generator and it upper bounds the existing black-
box generators. For the defenses, we consider both unsuper-
vised (MagNet) as well as supervised (AdvDef) approaches.
For the practical purpose in black-box setting, we do not
consider adaptive attack against MagNet.
A. Visualizations of Adversarial Examples
In this subsection, we visually compare ManiGen and
Carlini adversarial examples to their corresponding original
images. Figures 8-10 show random samples from the three
datasets, MNIST, CIFAR10, and STL10, respectively. In each
figure, the first row presents the original images, the second
row presents the corresponding Carlini examples, and the last
row presents the corresponding ManiGen examples.
Figure 8 presents randomly selected set of images from
MNIST, which cover all the ten different decimal digits. The
figure shows that ManiGen digits 5, 9, 7, and 8 are visually
close to the corresponding Carlini ones. On the other hand,
the ManiGen digits 4, 1, 3, and 6 contain more highlighted
(i.e., white) noise pixels. Additionally, ManiGen digits 2 and
0 have both extra dark and white noise pixels compared to
the Carlini and the original images. Therefore, some Carlini
examples (e.g., digit 0) looks slightly closer to the original
images than the corresponding ManiGen examples. However,
presented alone, these figures are still easy to be recognized by
humans. There are two aspects of reasons which include (1) the
MNIST images are simple and (2) the adversarial perturbation
generated by ManiGen does not change the semantic meaning
of the image.
When we move to the CIFAR10 dataset in Figure 9,
the difference between the Carlini and ManiGen adversarial
examples is becoming smaller. In CIFAR10, the Carlini and
ManiGen adversarial examples are almost identical in many
images (#226, #466, #122, #1358, #178, #1306, and #994).
Among others, the ManiGen adversarial examples contain
stronger perturbation. However, such adversarial perturbation
is meaningless and cannot mislead human’s prediction.
Lastly, the visualization in STL10 dataset (Figure 10) re-
flects the aforementioned trend again. Only in few of these
images (#1434, #1182, and #1355), the ManiGen adversarial
examples have stronger perturbation. Similar to before, these
perturbations are more like a meaningless noise which cannot
mislead human’s prediction. While in all other images, the
Carlini and ManiGen adversarial examples are quite similar
to each other.
Generally speaking, the slightly reduced visual quality of
some of ManiGen examples compared to Carlini is due to
the black-box design of ManiGen. That is, ManiGen does not
utilize any information from the classifier to guide the search
process for adversarial examples. In other words, ManiGen
trades slight decrease in visual quality of some adversarial
examples with the more practical black-box design approach.
Recall that ManiGen substitutes the lack of information about
the target classifier by searching across the approximated
manifold. Therefore, ManiGen needs to add, in some cases,
relatively larger perturbations to generate successful attack
examples. However, through our extensive experiments on the
8Fig. 8: Visualization of Original and Adversarial Examples in MNIST
Fig. 9: Visualization of Original and Adversarial Examples in CIFAR10
Fig. 10: Visualization of Original and Adversarial Examples in STL10
Dataset Example ClassifierStandalone MagNet AdvDef
MNIST
Original 99.7% 98.1% 98.4%
Carlini 0% 100% 99.5%
ManiGen 0% 97.5% 64.5%
CIFAR10
Original 89.5% 81.5% 86.2%
Carlini 0% 54.7% 88.5%
ManiGen 0% 46.9% 73%
STL10
Original 87.7% 48.9% 81.7%
Carlini 0% 51.5% 62%
ManiGen 1.5% 37% 58.5%
TABLE VI: Summary of Test Accuracy
three datasets (MNIST, CIFAR10, and STL10), we observe
that such perturbations are semantically meaningless to human
vision system especially when images get more complex.
Overall, both the ManiGen and Carlini adversarial examples
are hard to fool human vision system while extremely easy to
mislead classifier’s prediction.
B. Confusion Capabilities of Adversarial Examples
In this subsection, we evaluate the ability of ManiGen and
Carlini adversarial examples to mislead classifiers. Recall that,
an example misleads a classifier if it causes the classifier to
output a wrong classification class. We build an experimen-
tal labeled dataset which consists of 384 randomly selected
original images from each of the three datasets (a total of
1152 images), the corresponding Carlini adversarial examples,
and the corresponding ManiGen adversarial examples. Then,
we classify the images using (1) standalone classifier, (2)
classifier with MagNet, and (3) adversarially trained classifier,
AdvDef. The detailed structures and the training settings of
these classifiers are explained earlier in Section IV. The results
of measured test accuracy are summarized in Table VI
In the first column of Table VI, we start with the standalone
classifier’s test accuracy on original examples. In all three
datasets, the standalone classifier can achieve over 87% of test
accuracy which means that these classifiers are well trained
9under the attack free assumption. As we expected, the test
accuracy on ManiGen or Carlini adversarial examples has
a significant degeneration down to almost 0%. This clearly
shows that ManiGen and Carlini examples from all the datasets
have 100% success rate in misleading the standalone classifier.
In the next column, we repeat these measurements on the
same input examples. The difference is that the classifier is
protected by the MagNet. We can see that the classifier per-
forms much better than the standalone one on all the datasets.
More importantly, the results show that ManiGen examples are
more resistant to the defense (MagNet) than Carlini ones. As
shown in Table VI, the MagNet’s test accuracy on ManiGen
examples are always lower than that on Carlini examples.
More importantly, the difference increases with the increase
in the complexity of the dataset from MNIST to STL10. It is
worth to mention that the MagNet itself is hard to be scaled
to complex dataset. Its test accuracy on original examples
decreases significantly compared with standalone classifier in
the STL10 dataset.
In the last column of Table VI, we present the test accuracy
of the AdvDef, on different input examples. Compared with
MagNet, AdvDef has better scalability and is wildly accepted
as defense method against adversarial examples. However,
AdvDef is far from perfect especially in complex dataset.
For example in STL10 dataset, the test accuracy on Carlini
examples is only 62% compared with over 81% test accuracy
on original examples. If we compare the ManiGen and Car-
lini examples, we can see that using ManiGen can mislead
AdvDef as successful as using Carlini. Actually, adversarial
examples generated by ManiGen are more threatening (lower
test accuracy).
To summarize, we see from the evaluation results that (1)
both ManiGen and Carlini can mislead standalone classifier
with nearly 100% success rate and (2) when the classifier is
equipped with defense (MagNet or AdvDef), ManiGen can
generate more threatening adversarial examples than Carlini.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce a new adversarial example gen-
erator, dubbed ManiGen, that searches adversarial examples
along the manifold in a black-box fashion. Compared with
existing black-box generators, our approach has higher success
rate in misleading standalone classifier. Moreover, it does not
require classifier’s prediction confidence.
Through extensive experiments, we evaluate the confusion
capabilities of ManiGen and compare it with the white-box
generator, Carlini. The results show that it misleads standalone
machine learning models as successful as the Carlini on
different datasets. More seriously, it can mislead the classifier
with different defenses (MagNet and AdvDef) more effectively
than the Carlini.
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